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Appeal from the District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State ofIdaho, 
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Honorable John K. Butler, District Judge, Presiding 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant, Giltner Dairy, LLC ("Giltner"), has presented the Court with an abbreviated 
statement of the case and its history. Intervenor, 93 Golf Ranch, LLC ("Golf Ranch"), believes 
that the district court's FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND contained in its 
Memorandum Decision more completely sets forth the entire proceedings that took place with 
regard to this matter. R., pp. 83-85. 
II. ADDITIONAL ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Has the Idaho Supreme Court already ruled that ... "there is no statute authorizing 
judicial review of a county's action regarding a rezone application" in Burns Holdings, LLC v. 
Madison County Board ofComm'rs, 147 Idaho 660, 214 PJd 646 (2009)? 
2. If Giltner's Petition is not well grounded in fact, and warranted by existing law, 
should Golf Ranch be awarded its reasonable expenses and attorney's fees pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 11.2? 
ill. ARGUMENT 
A. Idaho Code § 31·1506 is Not Applicable to a Rezone Under LLUPA. 
After originally seeking judicial review pursuant to I.C. § 67-6521, Giltner amended its 
Petition for Judicial Review ("Petition") on the basis of Idaho Code § 31-1506(1). Although 
Idaho Code § 67-6511 expressly .provides governing bodies with discretion and authority to 
amend their zoning districts, Giltner apparently recognized that such an amendment does not 
constitute a "permit" that allows a property owner to take immediate steps to permanently alter 
the land. Idaho Code § 31-1506, as codified in Chapter 15 entitled "County Finances and 
Claims Against Counties, " provides: 



























Unless otherwise provided by law, judicial review of any act, order 
or proceeding of the board shall be initiated by any person 
aggrieved thereby within the same time and in the same manner as 
provided in chapter 52, title 67, Idaho Code, for judicial review of 
actions. 
Giltner argued at the hearing of this matter that the predecessor of this statute, Idaho Code 
§ 31-1509, had been part of Idaho's law for decades, and that it should serve as the basis for a 
judicial review of a rezone decision. A copy of the statute as it existed in 1983 is attached 
hereto as Exhibit "A" showing that it was first adopted in the late 1800's as R.S. § 1776, and 
first amended in 1895. The statute was amended and redesignated as I.C. § 31-1506 in 1994. 
Golf Ranch can fmd no instance where the Idaho Supreme Court has ever sanctioned or 
acknowledged the use of this code section as the basis for an appeal of a rezone or any other 
quasi-judicial decision of a governing board. Giltner has directed this court to Fox v. Board of 
County Comm'rs of Boundary Co., 114 Idaho 940, 763 P.2d 313 (Ct. App. 1988) (overruled in 
part on other grounds in 121 Idaho 686, 827 P.2d 699 (Ct. App. 1991)) in support of its 
argument. Fox involved an appeal of the Boundary County Board of Commissioners' renewal of 
two beer licenses. In construing Idaho Code § 31-1509, the predecessor to Idaho Code § 31-
1506, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
... [W]e are constrained to view I.C. § 31-1509 as 
providing a county taxpayer with the right to appeal any act, 
order or proceeding of the commissioners when any such 
act, order or proceeding is illegal or prejudicial to the 
public interest. 
(Emphasis added). 114 Idaho at 943. Giltner has not asserted in its Petition that the rezone 
decision of Jerome County was illegal or prejudicial to the public interest as was required by 
the predecessor statute. Golf Ranch suggests that the instant rezone decision does not meet the 
Court of Appeals' standard of an "act, order or proceeding [that] is illegal or prejudicial to the 
public interest," which was the standard previously articulated in I.C. § 31-1509. 
Giltner has cited Sandpoint Independent HighWay District v. Board of County Comm Irs 
of Bonner County, 138 Idaho 887, 71 P.3d 1034 (2003) as support for the proposition that Idaho 


























Code § 31-1506 may be used to review a quasi-judicial zoning decision. That case involved the 
board's administrative determination to hold an election relative to the dissolution of the 
Sandpoint Independent Highway District pursuant to Idaho Code § 40-1805. Once the petition 
to dissolve the district had been submitted to the board, its role was administrative in nature to 
submit the matter to the qualified electors of the district. As will be discussed, infra, Idaho 
Code § 31-1506 was intended for review of administrative decisions, and there is no evidence 
that the statute was ever intended to be utilized to review quasi-judicial decisions. 
Giltner has referred the Court to Allen v. Blaine County, 131 Idaho 138,953 P.2d 578 
(1998) as further support for its position. The Allen case was styled as both a declaratory 
judgment action and a judicial review of Blaine County's denial of the Allens' application to 
build a rental home on a lot that had been platted as a "non-buildable lot." In keeping with the 
legislative intent as described in the legislative history, the county was acting in. a purely 
administrative role in applying the plat restrictions to the Allens' property. It carmot seriously be 
argued that the county's application of that language in this instance constituted a quasi-judicial 
zoning action. As stated by the Court: 
When interpreting the meaning of statutory language, the 
Court is to give effect to the legislative intent and purpose of the 
statute. (Citations omitted). ... "The legislature'S intent in 
enacting the statute may be implied from the language used or 
inferred on grounds of policy or reasonableness" (Citations 
omitted). 
Allen, supra, 131 Idaho at 141. 
Although Giltner makes reference to Gibson v. Ada County, 139 Idaho 5, 72 P.3d 845 
(2003), the later case of Gibson v. Ada County, 142 Idaho 746, 133 P.3d 1211 (2006) (reh. den. 
2006) more fully addresses Idaho Code § 31-1506. That case involved an administrative 
personnel decision involving the Ada County Sheriff's Office in which the board refused to 
review the sheriffs decision to terminate Gibson's employment. The Court discussed the 
interplay of LR.C.P. Rule 84 and Idaho Code § 31-1506 and reiterated the content of LR.C.P. 
Rule 84: 


























Actions of state agencies or officers or actions of a local 
government, its officers or its units are not subject to judicial 
review unless expressly authorized by statute. 
133 P.3d at 1221. As stated in Burns, supra: 
There is no specific grant of authority to review the Board's action 
with respect to the request for rezone, and we may not assume the 
role of the legislature and grant that authority to ourselves. 
214 P.3d at 649. Giltner's reliance on Gibson does not overcome this Court's holding in Burns, 
supra. Although Giltner argues that Idaho Code § 31-1506 expressly authorizes judicial review 
of a county's rezoning decision, Giltner completely ignores the Court's holding in Burns, supra. 
If Giltner's position were to be sustained, the aforementioned holding in Burns, supra, would 
necessarily have to be overruled. Of course, that would present an untenable situation leaving 
rezoning decisions of only a county's governing board amenable to judicial review, while a 
municipality's rezoning decisions would not be subject to judicial review. Giltner was never 
able to adequately address this anomaly at the district court, although the issue was certainly 
raised by Golf Ranch in its Memorandum. R., p. 71-2. 
Giltner originally suggested to the district court that the case of Eastern Idaho Health 
Services, Inc. v. Burtenshaw, 122 Idaho 904, 841 P.2d 434 (1992), somehow supported its 
position that an appeal of a rezone or land use decision could be challenged under Idaho Code § 
31-1506. That decision dealt with a taxpayer's appeal of a board of county commissioners' 
refusal to grant a refund of penalty and interest on delinquent ad valorem taxes. Golf Ranch 
does not believe that Eastern Idaho lends any support to Giltner's arguments. Had the Idaho 
Legislature intended that an amendment of a zoning district under LLUP A could be appealed 
pursuant to a code section in the county finance portion of the Idaho Code, the legislature 
presumably would have so stated. Had the Idaho Supreme Court ever interpreted Idaho Code 
§ 31-1506 as being the appropriate mechanism for review of a zoning decision, there certainly 
would have been prior reported case law setting forth that proposition. However, if that had 
been the interpretation accorded to that statute by the Idaho Supreme Court, it would have 


























presented the Court with an untenable inconsistency, since the Local Land Use Plauning Act 
("LLUPA") provides that each "governing board" is entitled to adopt, amend or repeal its 
zoning ordinance and districts. See Idaho Code § 67-6511. Idaho Code § 67-6504 expressly 
states: 
A city council or board of county commiSSIOners, hereafter 
referred to as a governing board, may exercise all of the powers 
required and authorized by this chapter in accordance with this 
chapter. 
Idaho Code § 31-1506(1), by its own terms, is limited solely in its application to a county board 
of commissioners to the exclusion of a city council. Under Giltner's interpretation of Idaho 
Code § 31,1506, a rezone decision of a county board of commissioners made pursuant to 
LLUPA would be subject to judicial review, but a rezone decision by a city council would not 
be similarly reviewable. 
B. Statutory Construction. 
In City of Sandpoint v. Sandpoint Independent Highway District, 139 Idaho 65, 72 P.3d 
905 (2003), the Idaho Supreme Court discussed statutory construction relative to a 
determination of what the legislature intended a statute to mean. The Court stated: 
To determine that [statutory] intent, we examine not only the literal 
words of the statute, but also the reasonableness of proposed 
constructions, the public policy behind the statute, and its 
legislative history. (Citations omitted). Statues [sic-statutes] that 
are in pari materia must be construed together to effect legislative 
intent. Gooding County v. Wybenga, 137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 
(2002). Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same 
subject. 
Id. 139 Idaho at 69. Continuing, the Sandpoint Court stated: 
Where a statute with respect to one subject contains a 
certain provision, the omission of such provision from a similar 
statute concerning a related subject is significant to show that a 
different intention existed. Kopp v. State, 100 Idaho 160, 595 P.2d 
309 (1979). 
!d. Idaho Code § 31-1509, the predecessor statute to Idaho Code § 31-1506, was amended in 


























1993 and 1994. The legislative "STATEMENT OF PURPOSEIFISCAL IMPACT" statements 
for each year are attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C", respectively. In the STATEMENT 
OF PURPOSE for the 1993 amendment, the following may be noted: 
The current process for appeals is archaic and inconsistent 
with other sections of county law. The planning and zoning and 
medical indigency appeals are conducted as appeals under the 
APA. 
The types of decisions that are appealed are administrative 
or executive in nature, and the more appropriate method would be 
to use the AP A. 
(Emphasis added). 
In 1994, the language in the STATEMENT OF PURPOSE mirrored portions of the 
1993 amendment: 
The types of decisions that are appealed are administrative 
or executive in nature. 
There can be no doubt that a rezoning decision by a governing board is quasi-judicial in 
character, and neither "administrative or executive." The legislative history of this statute does 
not tend to support the arguments of Giltner in this proceeding. . 
The concept of the LLUP A, i.e., the regulation of land use, was never in the 
contemplation of the Idaho Legislature at the time of the original adoption of Idaho Code § 31-
1509 in the late 1800's. The fact that this Court has expressly detennined that LLUPA did not 
include a specific statute authorizing judicial review of a zoning district amendment should be 
regarded as purposeful, and evidences a different legislative interpretation than that which is 
advocated by Giltner relative to the applicability of Idaho Code § 31-1506. As late as last year, 
the Idaho Supreme Court stated as much in Burns, supra, 147 Idaho 660, 214 P.3d 646 (2009). 


























The Court stated: 
Even so, there was no right of judicial review of the Board's action 
with respect to the rezone application because, as with the 
application for an amendment to the comprehensive plan, there is 
no statute authorizing judicial review of a county's action 
regarding a rezone application. 
(Emphasis added). 214 P.3d at 649. The Court vacated the district court's decision in Burns 
Holding, supra, and dismissed the judicial review. 
In discussing statutes that are in pari materia, the Idaho Supreme Court discussed two 
different statutory provisions relating to "conflict of interest" in Gooding County v. Wybenga, 
137 Idaho 201, 46 P.3d 18 (2002). In that case, the Court stated: 
Statutes are in pari materia if they relate to the same 
subject. Grand Canyon Dories v. Idaho State Tax Commission, 124 
Idaho 1, 855 P.2d 462 (1993). Such statutes are construed together 
to effect legislative intent. Id Where two statutes appear to apply 
to the same case or subject matter, the specific statute will control 
over the more general statute. State v. Barnes, 133 Idaho 378, 987 
P.2d 290 (1999). 
137 Idaho at 204. see also V-I Oil Company v. Idaho Transportation Department, 131 Idaho 
482, 959 P.2d 463 (1998). 
In the instant case, the specific statute, i.e., LLUP A, describes all the land use actions 
which "governing boards, whether a county board of commissioners or a city council" are 
entitled to take, and further describes which of those actions constitutes a "permit" that is 
subject to a judicial review. There can be no doubt but that the LLUP A is the more specific 
statute when it comes to land use issues, and the judicial review of a local governing body's 
decision in that regard. Since a zoning district amendment does not constitute a "permit", as 
defined in LLUP A, the Court must necessarily conclude that the legislature intended to omit 
that action by a governing board from the scope of judicial review. Clearly, a neighbor such as 
Giltner would have the opportunity to perfect an appeal at the time a subdivision approval 
permit has been approved consistent with the zoning amendment. 



























Because Idaho's adoption of the LLUPA came after Idaho Code § 31-1509, the 
predecessor statute to Idaho Code § 31-1506, and because the LLUP A articulated those land use 
decisions which were reviewable pursuant to a petition for judicial review, Golf Ranch asserts 
that a zoning district amendment is ejusdem generis. That term relates to statutory construction 
where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things specifically mentioned. In 
addition, the maxim of statutory interpretation of expressio unius est exclusio alterius denotes 
that the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another. The LLUP A specifically identifies 
. those land use actions of a governing board which are amenable to a judicial review, but does 
not include a zoning district amendment, an action which does not result in the issuance of a 
"permit". To the extent that courts of this state may have previously extended a judicial review 
under LLUPA to a zoning district amendment, the courts may have to acknowledge that such 
review was statutorily inappropriate. For example, Chief Justice Donaldson wrote. in Love v. 
Board of County Comm'rs of Bingham Co., 105 Idaho 558, 671 P.2d 471 (1983): 
Under I.C. § 67-6521, the district court was empowered to review 
on appeal the rezoning decision of the County Commissioners. Hill 
v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 850, 623 P.2d 462 (1981); 
Walker-Schmidt Ranch v. Blaine Co., 101 Idaho 420, 614 P.2d 960 
(1980); Cooper v. Board of County Comm'rs, 101 Idaho 407, 614 
P.2d 947 (1980). 
105 Idaho at 559. That same issue was discussed in Justice Jim Jones' dissenting opinion in 
Burns, supra, in which Justice Burdick concurred: 
Indeed, following the enactment of LLUPA in 1975, this 
Court consistently held for over a quarter of a centmy that LLUP A 
authorized judicial review of county zoning decisions under either 
Idaho Code § 67-6519 or Idaho Code § 67-6521. ... Zoning 
actions that were legislative in nature, i.e., those affecting "a large 
area consisting of many parcels of property and disparate 
ownership," were not reviewable under either pre- or post -LLUP A. 
These cases were good law for 25 years. The Court has 
routinely held quasi-judicial zoning decisions, such as that 
involved in this case to be reviewable under LLUP A until the 
Court's 2008 decision in Highlands Development Corp. v. City of 



























Boise, 145 Idaho 958, 188 P.3d 900 (2008). There, the Court 
decided that LLUP A contained "no provision granting judicial 
review of the initial zoning classification applied to annexed 
property." Id. at 961, 188 P.3d at 903. Today, the Court expands 
the Highlands decision to preclude judicial review of any zoning 
decision under LLUPA. 
214 P.3d at 650-51. The majority in Burns, supra, stated: 
There is no specific grant of authority to review the Board's action 
with respect to the request for rezone, and we may not assume the 
role of the legislature and grant that authority to ourselves. 
214 P.3d at 649. 
If anything seems clear, it appears that the district court's logic in dismissing Giltner's 
Second Amended Petition for Judicial Review due to a lack of subject matter jurisdiction was 
entirely appropriate. R, pp. 92-94. The district court's decision predated this Court's decision in 
Burns, supra, but squares clearly with the Court's language that " ... there is no statute authorizing 
judicial review of a county's action regarding a rezone application." 214 P.3d at 649. 
IV. ATTORNEY'S FEES 
In Giltner Dairy, LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630,181 P.3d 1238 (2008) ("Giltner 
F'), the Court had before it the very same party as the petitioner in this proceeding. Giltner was 
represented by the very same law finn then as it is in the instant case. Although Giltner I involved 
an ameudment to the comprehensive plan relating to the very same property at issue in the instant 
case, Giltner and its counsel were advised: 
A request to change the comprehensive plan map is not an 
application for a permit, and Giltner Dairy admits there was no 
application for a permit in this case. Therefore, Idaho Code § 67-
6519 does not provide any right to obtain judicial review in this case. 
181 P.3d at 1241. In pursuit of its appeal, Giltner has now advanced the logic that Idaho Code 



























§ 31-1506 should serve as the jurisdictional basis to provide judicial review for a land use 
rezoning decision, even though it would apply only to the governing board of a county, and not a 
city. Shortly after Giltner's appeal was filed, but prior to the issuance of the Clerk's Certificate (R., 
p. 105), this Court issued its decision in Burns, supra, which clearly stated: 
. . . [Tlhere is no statute authorizing judicial review of a county's 
action regarding a rezone application. 
214 P.3d at 649. The continued pursuit of the instant appeal is not well grounded in fact, and is 
not warranted by existing law. Although Giltner has cursorily cited Burns, supra, in its 
Appellant's Brief at p. 7 and p. 9, Giltner never acknowledged the Court's statement set forth 
above. Giltner has done nothing in the way of asserting a good faith argument for the "extension, 
modification, or reversal of existing law." Golf Ranch is only too aware of Giltner's thinly veiled 
plan to cause Golf Ranch unnecessary delay in the development of its property. The application 
which gave rise to Giltner I was filed on November 4, 2005. R., p. 83. The rezone process that is 
the subject of this Petition for Judicial Review began on July 24, 2008. Id Golf Ranch contends 
that the provisions ofLA.R. Rule 11.2 are applicable to the facts of this case, and that Golf Ranch 
should be awarded its reasonable expenses and attorneys fees in accordance with that rule. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Jurisdiction to review the Board of Commissioners' decision to rezone the subject 
property does not exist pursuant to either Idaho Code § 67-6521 or Idaho Code § 31-1506. 
Subject matter jurisdiction is lacking under either statute. Golf Ranch requests that the decision 
of the district court dismissing Giltner's Petition for Judicial Review in this matter be affirmed. 
Furthermore, Golf Ranch requests that this Court make the requisite determinations pursuant to 


























LA.R. Rule 11.2 in order to allow for an award of costs and attorney fees to Golf Ranch. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ~day of March, 2010. 
ROBERTSON &, SLETTE, PLLC 
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Jerome Co. Prosecutor [ xl U.S. Mail 
233W.Main [ 1 Overnight Courier 
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Terrence R. Wbite 
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Nampa, ID 83687 [ 1 Facsimile Transmission 
lN1ERVENOR'S BRIEF - 12 
31·1509 COUNTIEs AND COUNTY LAW 162 
Collateral References. Power of county or 
its officials to compromise claim. 15 A.L,R2d 
1359. 
All>ount of ,damages stated in' notice of 
claim against' municipality or county as, 
limiting amount orrecovery, 24 A.L:R.3d 965: 
Incapacity caused by .accident. in sUit' as' 
affecting notice of claim required as condition 
of holding local governmental unit liable for 
personal injury, 44 A.L.R.8d 1108. 
Governmental toit liability' for injuries 
caused by negligently released individual, 6 
A.L.R.4th 1155. 
31,.1509. Appeal from order of board. - Any time within twenty (20) , 
days after the first publication or posting bfthe stfttllment, as ,required hy 
section 31,819, an appeal may be taken frolll any act, order at proceEiiilng of 
the board, by any person aggrieved thereby, or by any taxpayer of the county 
when any demand is allowed against the county or when he deems Imy such 
act, order'or proceeding illegal 01' prejudicial to the public interests; and no 
such act, order or proceeding whatever, which directly or indirectly renders 
the county, liable for the paYJ:llegt, of the sum of $800,00 or over, or its 
equivalent, shall be valid until after the expiration of the time allowed for 
appeal or until such appeal, if taken, shall be finally determined; but tlJ,ere 
is expected from the operation hereof all orde,s for the, payment of those 
sums specially dIrected by law to be paid, or payments iIi fulfillment of acts 
or proceedings made and confirmed according to the provisions hereof:,[R.S., 
§ 1776; am. 1895, p. 50, § 1; reen, 1889, p. 248, § 1; am. R.C., § 1950; am. 
1913, ch, 143; § 3, p. 506; reen. C:L., § 1950; 0.8., § 3509; I,C.A:, 
§ 30·1;1.08.] , 
Cross ref. Appeals from commissioners' 
orders"relating to change of highways across 
private land., § ,40-710. 
Appeals from order revoking toU road, 
bridge, or ferry license, § 40·1406. 
Cited in! Corker v. Boejd of County 
Coinm'rs, 10 Idaho 255, 77 P. 633 (1904); Rbea 
,v. Board of County Comm'r., 12 Idaho 455, 13 
Idaho 59, 88 P. 89 (1907); Gilbert v. Callyon 
County, I:4I4aho' 429, 94 p, 1027 (1908); 
Drainage,Dist. No.2 v. Ada County, 38 Idaho 
778, 226 P. 290 (1924); Stark v. McLaugblin, 
45 Idaho 112, 261 P. 244 (1927); Johnson v, 
Young, 53 Idaho 271, 23 P,2d 723 (1933); 
Breding v. Board of County Comm'rs, 55 
Idaho 480, 44 P,2d 290 (1935); In re Felton'. 
Petition, 79 Idaho 325, 316 P,2d 1064; 
Mosman v. Mathison, 90 Idaho 76, 408 P,2d 
450 (1965); Nicolaus v. Bodine, 92 Idaho 639, 
448 P.2d 645 (1968); Coddington v. City of 
Lewiston, 96 Idaho 135, 525,P.2d 330 (1974); 
Clark v. Ada County Bd, ofComm'rs, 98 Idaho 





Appeal from entire order. 
Bond. 
Burden of proof on appeal. 
'..:. 
Collateral. actions allowed" 
Collateral actions prohibited, 
Jilffect of appeal. 
Failure to appeal. 
Improper claims. .' 
Notl"cie of appeal: 
Procedure' on appeal. 
Publication of coxnrilissiqner's actions. 
Remedy by appeal. 
Right of appeal. 
Stiitlltory remedy. 
Time for appeal. 
Who may appeal. 
Witnesses' fees. 
Alternative Remedy. 
Owners through whose lands priva,te road 
is open,ed J'!,eed not appef:l.1, but may refuse'to 
accept award and compel condemna.tion pro· 
ceadings,' by county. Latah County v. 
Hasfurther, 12 Idaho 797, 88 P. 433 (1907). 
Appealable ,Orders. 
Tha following orders are appealable: 
Discretionary orders. Meller v. Board of 
County Corom'rs, 4 ld,aho 44, 35 P. 712 (1894). 
An order' for the issuance and sale> of 
funding bonds, .Mason v. Lieuallen) 4 Idaho 
415, 39 P. 1117 (1895), 
An order allowing a claim for printing the 
delinquent tax list. Jolly v. Woodward, 4 




(1"\93 'Ito\JG;) STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 02035 
The pUl:pose of this bill is to provide for the appeal of 
cOl!nty commissioner decisions in the same manner as judicial review 
of actions under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) , chapter 
52, title 67, Idaho Code. 
The current process for appeals is archaic and inconsistent 
with other sections of county law. The planning and zoning and 
medical indigency· appeals are conducted as appeals un'aer the APA. 
The current process of appellate procedure makes the district 
judge the fourth or "super" commissioner with the ;'billfyto· 
overrule the factual determinations and judgments of three 
individuals. 
The types of decisions that are appealed are administrative or 
executive in natur,e and the more appropriate method would be to use 
the APA. This method of appeal will protect the rights of those 
affected by·county commission decisions while giving consideration 
to co~nty commission judgments. 
FISCAL NOTE 
NONE. 




STATEMENT OF PURPOSE 
RS 03272 
The purpose of this bill is to clarifY that time limits for appeals from decisions of the board 
of county commis~ioners be mandatory rather than permissive. The types of decisions that are 
appealed are administrative or executive in nature. Certainty as to the time for appealing 'board 
decisions is necessary for the proper administration of county government. 
Clarification of the appeals process began with the passage of House Bill 120 from the 1993 
. . ~ 
legislative session. Two additional code sections require repeal iiI order to provide a single method 
of appeal through the judicial review process of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act. 
An emergency clause is used because or the confusion existing in current statutes. 
Immediate implementation will avoid costly court action. 
FISCAL NOTE 
There is no financial impact on the state general fimd or on county operating budgets o~her 
than savings from court costs. 
CONTACT: 
Daniel G. Chadwick, Executive Director 
Idaho Association of Counties 
(208) 345-9126 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSElFfSCAL NOTE 
EXHIBIT C 
